No. 1 (Spring)

A Kantian Take on Fallible Principles and Judgments

By: Samuel Kahn - Indiana University/Purdue University, Indianapolis
This article explores Kant's theory of conscience in order to determine whether it is philosophically defensible, focusing on two issues in particular: the blameworthiness of acting contrary to fallible knowledge and the blamelessness of acting according to a fallible judgment. It is argued that that Kant's theory requires neither supplementation nor modification regarding agents who fail in their resolution to act subjectively rightly and, hence, act subjectively wrongly but objectively rightly. It is also argued that Kant might be forced to say that an agent is morally blameless for any action performed in accordance with his best judgment but that ...
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Why We Aren’t and Couldn’t Be Brains in Vats

By: Patrick Laine - University of Minnesota
This article argues that skeptical scenarios aimed at doubting the existence of the external world presuppose the view that the mind is not embodied and embedded in the world. By questioning this view, the article aims to undermine such external-world skepticism and point toward the possibility of understanding the mind as inherently connected to the world. ...
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